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Abstract 
 
Over the last 50 years advances in technology have led to an increase in the 
complexity and sophistication of systems. More complex systems can be harder to 
maintain and the root cause of a fault more difficult to isolate.  
 
Down-time resulting from a system failure can be dangerous or expensive depending 
on the type of system. In aircraft systems the ability to quickly diagnose the causes of 
a fault can have a significant impact on the time taken to rectify the problem and 
return the aircraft to service. In chemical process plants the need to diagnose causes of 
a safety critical failure in a system can be vital and a diagnosis may be required within 
minutes. Speed of fault isolation can save time, reduce costs and increase company 
productivity and therefore profits. System fault diagnosis is the process of identifying 
the cause of a malfunction by observing its effect at various test points. 
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a method that describes all possible causes of a specified 
system state in terms of the state of the components within the system. A system 
model is used to identify the states the system should be in at any point in time. This 
paper presents a method for diagnosing faults in systems using FTA to explain the 
deviations from normal operation observed in sensor outputs. The causes of a system's 
failure modes will be described in terms of the component states. This will be 
achieved with the use of coherent and non-coherent fault trees. A coherent fault tree is 
constructed from AND and OR logic, therefore only considers component failed 
states. The non-coherent method expands this allowing the use of NOT logic which 
implies that the existence of component failed states and working states are both taken 
into account. This paper illustrates the concepts of this method by applying the 
technique to a simplified water tank level control system. 
 
Keywords: fault diagnosis, fault tree analysis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A system can be analysed for faults in two different ways. The first is to test the 
system functionality at one point in time. The second continuously monitors the 
system and detects faults as they occur.  
 
An example of an approach that carries out a series of tests to determine the system 
status at one point in time is the sequential fault diagnostic tool developed by Novak 
et al [1-5]. The approach uses information about which symptoms are exhibited when 
the faults are present. The sequential fault diagnostic tool determines the best 
sequence to conduct the test to locate the fault condition in the cheapest (or fastest) 
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way. A similar method by Pattipati et al [6] uses heuristic algorithms in order to 
determine the most cost-effective sequence of tests. These methods are limited to 
situations where only a single fault is expected to exist at any point in time; they do 
not take into consideration multiple component failures. Shakeri et al [7] extended 
sequential test sequencing to diagnose multiple failures in systems. However, this 
method takes a considerable length of time to obtain a diagnosis. 
 
Another approach to diagnosis is the use of graphical models to describe the 
propagation of faults in systems. Rao [8] developed two algorithms that use the 
information from directed graphs of systems to diagnose single failures at one point in 
time. This technique was developed further by Pattipati [9] to diagnose multiple 
failures in systems. This graphical method however does not take into consideration 
faults that do not immediately affect the status of the system when they occur. 
 
Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a structured, qualitative analysis of a 
system, subsystem or function that can be used to identify potential system failure 
modes, their causes and the effects on the system operation associated with the failure 
modes occurrence. Price [10] demonstrated the use of automated FMEA to generate 
reports that could be used in a diagnostic tool to diagnose multiple faults in systems at 
one point in time. The failures from the FMEA are only generated to a chosen 
likelihood of occurrence; therefore all possible outcomes of failure for a system 
scenario may not be obtained. Paasch and Mocko [11] use FMEA and FTA to develop 
a model that uses matrix manipulation for diagnosing faults in systems at one point in 
time. This research does not however consider multiple failures. 
 
Papadopoulos [12] has carried out work using statecharts and fault trees to provide 
continuous on-line monitoring and rectification of systems. NOT logic is excluded 
from the fault trees; therefore only component failures are taken into account to obtain 
diagnosis. As a result, some faults occurring simultaneously have required conflicting 
remedial procedures. Yangping [13] also developed a fault tree based method that 
only considers component failures, which uses genetic algorithms to continuously 
monitor for faults in nuclear power plants. Genetic search is slow in obtaining 
solutions and there can be problems determining when a global rather than a local 
diagnosis has been obtained.  
 
Many system failures are not usually the result of one single fault. Therefore the 
ability to diagnose multiple faults is vitally important. Methods of finding faults or 
combinations of faults as they occur are the subject of this paper. The approach is 
based on the fault tree method [14-16]. This is traditionally used to quantify the 
likelihood of a system failure. In this application the logic diagram is used to develop 
causes of a system symptom exhibited by a sensor reading, in terms of component 
conditions. In order to illustrate the features of the method described in this paper it 
will be applied to a simplified water tank level control system.
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2. The Water Tank System 
 
The water tank system is illustrated in Figure 1. It aims to maintain the level of water 
between two pre-determined limits. In normal operational mode water flows out of 
the system through valve V2. The level control system determines when water is 
flowing from the tank and then refills it by opening valve V1 until the desired tank 
level is reached. The overspill tray located beneath the tank catches water if the tank 
has ruptured, if water has leaked out through a crack or hole, or if the water level 
overflows from the top.  
 
Figure 1: Water tank system 
 
 
2.1 System Component Description 
 
The water tank system shown in Figure 1 consists of three valves labelled V1, V2 and 
V3, two level sensors represented by S1 and S2, two controllers C1 and C2, and an 
overspill tray denoted TRAY. There are six sections of pipes identified by the labels 
P1 to P6. 
 
V1 is an air-to-open (A/O) inlet valve controlled by C1. The level sensor S1 detects 
the height of the water in the tank. In normal operating mode if the water in the tank 
falls below the required level (as indicated by the sensor S1), the controller C1 would 
open valve V1 allowing water into the tank. Conversely, if the water in the tank rises 
to the required level then C1 will close V1. 
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V2 is a manual (MAN) valve, controlled by an operator in response to demand. 
Finally valve V3 is an air-to-close valve (A/C) that operates as a safety valve 
controlled by C2. Normally this will only become operational when a component 
failure occurs that causes a very high level of water in the tank. A signal from S2 
would cause the controller C2 to open valve V3 to reduce the level of water in the 
tank.  
 
The overspill tray, located underneath the tank collects any spillages that may occur 
due to a failure in the system. So, water in the overspill tray will occur if the tank has 
ruptured, is leaking, or if the water level overflows from the top of the tank. 
 
 
2.2 System Operating Modes 
 
2.2.1 Sensor Locations 
 
The status of the system is determined using measurements provided by flow sensors 
situated next to each of the three valves in the system. The sensors are denoted by 
VF1, VF2 and VF3 for locations at V1, V2 and V3 respectively. These each detect the 
presence or absence of flow of water, which can be denoted as flow ‘F’, or no flow 
‘NF’ respectively. For this demonstration study it is assumed the sensors are perfectly 
reliable. A fourth sensor denoted by SP1 is located in the overspill tray to indicate if 
any water has escaped from the tank. Its reading is interpreted as water ‘W’, or no 
water ‘NW’. The sensor locations described above are called the system observation 
points. The observation points for V1, V2, V3 and TRAY generated 16 different 
scenarios that the system potentially could produce. These are listed in Table 1. 
 
 
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY  Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY 
1 F F F W  9 NF F F W 
2 F F F NW  10 NF F F NW 
3 F F NF W  11 NF F NF W 
4 F F NF NW  12 NF F NF NW 
5 F NF F W  13 NF NF F W 
6 F NF F NW  14 NF NF F NW 
7 F NF NF W  15 NF NF NF W 
8 F NF NF NW  16 NF NF NF NW 
 
Table 1: System scenarios 
 
Were this a real system additional sensors could be added in order to provide a more 
complete picture of its operating state. The level control sensors S1 and S2 could also 
be used. However for the purposes of demonstrating the fault tree based fault 
diagnostics technique the system sensors as described are sufficient, without any 
additional complexity. 
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The system has two operating modes; these being ‘ACTIVE’ when the operator opens 
valve V2, or ‘DORMANT’ when V2 is closed. In the ACTIVE operating mode water 
is taken out of the system through valve V2 and the tank is refilled by water coming 
in through valve V1 from the main water supply. Water would not exit the system 
through valve V3 and there would be no water in the overspill tray. The sensor 
readings for the system when ACTIVE should be those given in scenario 4, Table 1. 
In the DORMANT operating mode the system is effectively on standby with all three 
valves remaining closed and the overspill tray empty. This should give the sensor 
readings given in scenario 16, Table 1. 
 
The sensor readings given by scenarios 4 and 16 are those which, under steady state 
conditions, represent the model of how the system should behave when ACTIVE and 
DORMANT respectively. Given that the system is in the ACTIVE or DORMANT 
state any sensor readings that deviate from those expected are regarded as being 
indicative of some fault within the system. 
 
 
2.2.2 Possible Component Failures 
 
In order to apply FTA to a system the faults that could occur for each of the system 
components need to be defined. Table 2 contains a list of possible component failures 
and their code. 
 
The two operating modes are also represented in the fault trees. ACTIVE signifies the 
operator has attempted to open valve V2. DORMANT is used to indicate that the 
operator has tried to close V2. It should be noted that this is a two mode system and 
so only one of the variables ACTIVE or DORMANT can be true at any time. 
 
 
Code  Component Failure  Code  Component Failure 
PiB (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) - Pipe Pi is Blocked  CiFH (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) - Controller Ci Fails High 
PiF (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) - Pipe Pi is Fractured  CiFL (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) - Controller Ci Fails Low 
ViFC (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) - Valve Vi Fails Closed  TR - Water Tank Ruptured 
ViFO (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) - Valve Vi Fails Open  TL - Water Tank Leaks 
SiFH (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) - Sensor Si Fails High  NWMS - No Water from Main 
SiFL (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) - Sensor Si Fails Low    Supply 
 
Table 2: Potential component failures 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3. Sensor Deviation Models 
 
In the application of FTA to the system fault diagnostics a series of failure logic 
diagrams are produced representing the causes of any sensors readings. These are 
developed in a fault tree in terms of the component failure conditions of the system 
operating state. The list of all possible sensor readings for the system is shown in 
Table 3. 
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Abbreviation  Sensor Readings  Abbreviation  Sensor Readings 
FTV1 - Flow Through Valve V1  NFTV1 - No Flow Through Valve V1 
FTV2 - Flow Through Valve V2  NFTV2 - No Flow Through Valve V2 
FTV3 - Flow Through Valve V3  WOST - Water in the Overspill Tray 
 
Table 3: Sensor readings 
 
Two other possible sensor readings for the system are ‘no flow through valve V3’ and 
‘no water in the overspill tray’. However, these sensor readings would occur under 
normal operational conditions (i.e. without any failures occurring) in both the 
ACTIVE and the DORMANT operating states. 
 
 
3.1 Fault Tree Construction 
 
Fault trees were generated for each sensor reading listed in Table 3 using both 
coherent and non-coherent methods. Coherent fault trees are constructed from AND 
and OR logic and feature only component failure events in the causes of sensor status. 
The non-coherent method expands this allowing the use of the NOT operator. This 
implies that both the component failed and working states are taken into account 
when developing the causes of the sensor status. 
 
3.1.1 Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading Flow Through Valve V2 
 
Figure 2: Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading 
Flow Through Valve V2 
 
The coherent fault tree for the sensor reading ‘flow through valve V2’ is presented in 
Figure 2. Referring to Figure 1 ‘flow through valve V2’ can only occur because V2 is 
open. There are two possibilities for having V2 open, these being that either the valve 
has failed open, which is a basic event, or the system is in a flow phase and is 
therefore in the ACTIVE operating mode, represented by a house event. The two 
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prospective outcomes terminate the logic development – in this instance the fault tree 
is small. 
 
 
3.1.2 Non-Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading Flow Through Valve V2 
 
 
Figure 3a: Non-Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading  
Flow Through Valve V2 
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Figure 3c: Non-Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading  
Flow Through Valve V2 – Transfer 2 
 
 
Figure 3b: Non-Coherent Fault Tree for the Sensor Reading  
Flow Through Valve V2 – Transfer 1 
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The non-coherent fault tree for the sensor reading ‘flow through valve V2’ is shown 
in Figures 3a to 3c. The information described by the coherent fault tree in Section 
3.1.1 can now be expanded to include everything in the system that is known not to 
have failed. Figures 3a to 3c show that the introduction of NOT logic significantly 
increases the amount of information known about the system behaviour. 
 
‘Flow through valve V2’ occurs because V2 is open and also because there is water 
available. As in the coherent fault tree V2 is open either because it has failed open or 
it is in a flow phase, therefore is in the ACTIVE operating mode. If V2 is open then it 
is definitely not closed. Therefore it cannot have failed closed or be in a no flow 
(DORMANT) phase.  
 
As well as the valve being open water has to be available at valve V2 in order to get 
flow. Therefore water can pass through pipes P3 and P4, indicating that P3 is not 
blocked or fractured and P4 is not blocked. Water also must be available to pass from 
the tank to pipe P3. Therefore water is contained in the tank, indicating that it has not 
ruptured, and water is being supplied to the tank, indicating that pipes P1 and P2 are 
clear and water is coming into the tank. Therefore water is available from the main 
supply and water can be passed through valve V1. These non-failures together with 
the potential causes of water through V2 can be combined using an AND gate to form 
the non-coherent fault tree for the sensor reading. 
 
 
3.2 System Fault Detection 
 
The system was modelled by four different schemes, of differing complexity, in order 
to construct the scenarios generated from the system observation points (see Table 1). 
A fifth scheme that looks at switching the system operating mode is also discussed. It 
has been assumed throughout that the system was in a steady-state operating 
condition. Dynamic considerations are also discussed later (see Section 4.5). 
 
3.2.1 Scheme 1 
 
In this scheme coherent fault trees were used to develop causes of sensor deviations. 
At any given time the sensors must indicate one of the 16 scenarios listed in Table 1. 
If the system is ACTIVE the sensors should show the readings as in scenario 4 of 
Table 1. In the DORMANT state they should show the readings in scenario 16. When 
the actual readings do not match the pattern of the model it suggests a fault exists in at 
least one of the system components. To find all possible causes, a top event structure 
can be constructed from the information given by the system observation points. In 
this scheme only the observation points giving sensor readings that deviate from the 
normal operating mode of the system are considered. For a given set of sensor 
readings the causes of the scenario are developed as fault trees. These are constructed 
by combining the causes of sensor readings which deviate from that expected using an 
AND gate. This scheme is now demonstrated assuming the system is ACTIVE and 
the sensor readings from scenario 1 from Table 1 are obtained. 
 
Table 4 below contains sensor readings expected when the system is in the ACTIVE 
operating mode (scenario 4) and the actual reading scenario 1. 
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Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY 
4 ACTIVE  F F NF NW 
1 F F F W 
 
Table 4: ACTIVE operating mode with expected and actual sensor readings 
 
The table shows that the sensor reading for valve V3 is ‘flow’, when in the ACTIVE 
operating mode it should be ‘no flow’. Also the sensor SP1 in the overspill tray 
should read ‘no water’ but it is indicating that there is water present. Therefore these 
sensors show that in scenario 1 there are two sensors that have deviated from their 
expected readings in the normal operating mode. 
 
In scheme 1 coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor readings are combined as 
inputs to an AND gate to form the scenario’s top event structure. This is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode  
containing just deviated sensor readings 
 
A qualitative analysis of this fault tree will produce its minimal cut sets. These are a 
list of all the combinations of component failures that would cause the sensor readings 
obtained. Analysis of the fault tree structure given in Figure 4 produces in total 102 
potential causes. From closer inspection though only 15 of these will produce the top 
event structure. The remaining 87 are incorrect, the causes of this are discussed 
below. 
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The 15 valid potential causes are listed below in Table 5.  
 
Number Potential Causes  Number Potential Causes 
1) TL.S2FH  9) S1FL.TL.P4B 
2) TL.C2FH  10) C1FL.TL.P3B 
3) TL.V3FO  11) C1FL.TL.P3F 
4) V1FO.TL.P3B  12) C1FL.TL.P4B 
5) V1FO.TL.P3F  13) V1FO.V2FC.TL 
6) V1FO.TL.P4B  14) S1FL.V2FC.TL 
7) S1FL.TL.P3B  15) C1FL.V2FC.TL 
8) S1FL.TL.P3F    
 
Table 5: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the  
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 1 
 
The coherent fault trees for the sensor readings ‘flow through valve V3’ and ‘water in 
the overspill tray’ are both valid when analysed individually. However, one of the 
reasons for obtaining ‘water in the overspill tray’ is that no flow through valve V3 
occurs, contradicting the sensor reading ‘flow through valve V3’. With no NOT logic 
present in the fault trees to indicate the component working states conflicting potential 
causes are not removed. For example one of the incorrect minimal cut sets is 
V1FO.P3B.P5B. This minimal cut set would give water in the overspill tray, however 
pipe P5 is blocked so water cannot get through V3, contradicting the top event 
structure. Therefore coherent fault trees do not contain enough information about 
system behaviour, implying scheme 1 is not a very reliable method. 
 
As well as the problem of invalid potential causes the number of valid potential 
causes of scenario 1 listed above is quite large. Therefore it would be difficult to 
determine which one could be the actual cause. Scheme 1 does not take into account 
the sensor readings from the observation points in the scenario that are correct for the 
chosen operating mode. Only the first 3 potential causes actually produce scenario 1 
when the sensor readings from the observation points at valves V1 and V2 are taken 
into account. The other potential causes are all valid for the sensor reading flow 
through V1, but would result in no flow through valve V2. This issue is addressed in 
scheme 2 where information from the sensors that are operating correctly is used to 
evaluate which parts of the system must function. 
 
 
3.2.2 Scheme 2 
 
Coherent fault trees for sensor readings are also used in scheme 2. In this case though 
a consistency check is introduced into the model by including all sensor readings 
obtained at any point in the construction of the top event for each scenario. Where 
sensor readings are as they should be they are included as NOT failed events in the 
top event structure. Writing them in their equivalent negated form now includes 
sensor readings not considered in scheme 1 that are true to the normal chosen 
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operating mode. For example, if the sensor reading for valve V1 was ‘flow’ then this 
would be equivalent to saying that there is ‘NOT no flow’. This therefore produces a 
list of working states for flow through valve V1. The fault trees for a given set of 
sensor readings are constructed by combining both the sensor readings that deviate 
from that expected, together with the expected sensor readings in their equivalent 
negated form using an AND gate. Scheme 2 is now demonstrated again assuming the 
sensor readings of scenario 1 are obtained. 
 
Table 6 below contains the ACTIVE operating mode for the system (scenario 4) and 
scenario 1 with the sensor readings for valves V1 and V2 written in negated form. 
Fault trees for these sensor readings can now be obtained and included in the model 
along with those for the deviated sensor readings in order to check consistency. 
  
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY 
4 ACTIVE  F F NF NW 
1 NOT NF NOT NF F W 
 
Table 6: ACTIVE operating mode and scenario 1 
 
The coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor readings are combined with the 
consistency checks as inputs to an AND gate, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode 
containing both deviated sensor readings and consistency checks 
 
A qualitative analysis of this fault tree, which is non-coherent in structure, produces 
prime implicants. Prime implicants are combinations of component states (working 
and failed), that produce the sensor readings obtained. As only failed components 
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need to be considered, the working states are then removed from the prime implicants 
to give the coherent approximation. 
 
The cause of NOT no flow through valve V1 is: 
                              P1B.P1F.P2B.S1FH.C1FH.V1FC.V2FC.NWMS 
 
The cause of NOT no flow through valve V2 is: 
TR.NWMS.P3B.P3F.P4B V2FC P1B.P1F.P2B.S1FH.C1FH.V1FC 
 
(In the list of component states given above the bar over the event code means NOT 
that event). 
 
These combined (ANDed) together with the potential causes listed in Table 5 from 
scheme 1 shows that scheme 2 produces 3 potential causes of scenario 1 in the 
ACTIVE operating mode, these are listed in Table 7.  
 
Number 
Potential Causes Coherent 
Approximation 
1) NWMS.TR.P2B.P1F.P1B.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.V1FC.C1FH.S1FH.S2FH TL.S2FH 
2) NWMS.TR.P2B.P1F.P1B.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.V1FC.C1FH.S1FH.C2FH TL.C2FH 
3) NWMS.TR.P2B.P1F.P1B.V2FC.TL.P4B.P3B.P3F.V1FC.C1FH.S1FH.V3FO TL.V3FO 
 
Table 7: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the  
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 2 
 
The potential causes listed above include the working components. Removing these 
produces a list of the potential causes containing only failed components, as shown in 
Table 7 in the Coherent Approximation column. These are the correct causes of 
scenario 1. This shows that for this particular scenario scheme 2 is a better model at 
pinpointing the actual cause compared to scheme 1. However, scheme 1 showed that 
coherent fault trees do not contain enough information about system behaviour to 
obtain a reliable list of potential causes. Scheme 2 uses the same fault trees, so invalid 
results from combining the deviated sensor readings may still occur. NOT logic is 
introduced into the fault trees for each sensor reading in scheme 3 in order to indicate 
which components are working. 
 
 
3.2.3 Scheme 3 
 
In scheme 3 system behaviour is modelled using non-coherent fault trees. As in 
scheme 1 the causes of the sensor readings are given in a fault tree structure obtained 
using only the sensor readings that deviated from the normal system operating mode. 
Therefore it does not include a consistency check. To illustrate scheme 3 the top event 
structure (assuming, as before, the sensor readings represented by scenario 1 have 
been obtained), can be constructed in the same way as for scheme 1 (see Figure 4), 
but using non-coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor readings. 
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Analysis of the faults, as in scheme 2, produces prime implicants. 15 potential causes 
of scenario 1 are produced by scheme 3. After removing the working state events 
these are the same as those obtained by scheme 1 which are valid for the deviated 
sensor readings (see Table 5). Scheme 3 therefore shows that introducing NOT logic 
into the fault trees indicates which components are working for each deviated sensor 
reading and removes any conflicting potential causes. 
 
There is again quite a large number of alternatives and it would be difficult to 
determine which one could be the actual cause. In the same way as for scheme 1, 
scheme 3 does not take into account the sensor readings from the observation points 
in the scenario that are correct for the chosen operating mode. Some of the potential 
causes listed in the example may be invalid. This scheme has failed to differentiate 
between the potential causes and so scheme 4, which contains the additional 
complexity of non-coherent sensor deviations with consistency checks, may provide a 
better analysis option. 
 
 
3.2.4 Scheme 4 
 
Scheme 4 modelled system behaviour using non-coherent fault trees for sensor 
deviations. The top event structure for scenario 1 using scheme 4 is shown in Figure 
5. Analysis of the faults, as in schemes 2 and 3 produces prime implicants. Removing 
the working component states gives the coherent approximation. There are 3 potential 
causes of scenario 1, listed below in Table 8. 
 
Number Potential Causes 
1) TL.S2FH 
2) TL.C2FH 
3) TL.V3FO 
 
Table 8: Potential causes of scenario 1 in the  
ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 4 
 
The potential causes of scenario 1 in Table 8 are the same as those obtained using 
scheme 2 after removing the working components (see Table 7). This shows that 
schemes 2 and 4 are better models than 1 and 3 at pinpointing the actual cause of 
scenario 1. Compared to the result obtained from scheme 3 the model in scheme 4 
strengthens the belief that not enough information is being obtained by only 
considering sensors that have deviated from their expected readings. 
 
The performance of the four schemes has been investigated to evaluate their potential 
causes of all 16 scenarios. Schemes 1 and 2 have both produced potential causes that 
are invalid to the top event structure. For example, for scenario 5 schemes 1 and 2 
produce 132 and 111 potential causes respectively for their top event structures. Only 
24 of these results for the two schemes are actually valid even though the fault trees 
for the sensor readings are correct when analysed individually. For certain scenarios 
scheme 2 has also removed potential causes that are valid to the top event structure. 
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This implies that there is not enough information in the coherent fault trees to explain 
the system behaviour. Scheme 4 produces the best performance for both the ACTIVE 
and the DORMANT operating modes. 
 
 
3.2.5 Scheme 5 
 
The two operating modes for the system are ACTIVE when the operator opens valve 
V2, or DORMANT when V2 is closed. Scheme 5 involves changing the operating 
state of the system in order to examine the system behaviour. This can be used along 
side any of the other four schemes previously discussed. Schemes 2 and 4 have both 
narrowed the potential causes of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode down to 3 
possibilities, (see Table 8). These all indicate that the tank is definitely leaking (TL) to 
create water in the overspill tray, but it is unclear as to whether sensor S2 has failed 
high (S2FH), controller C2 has failed high (C2FH) or valve V3 has failed open 
(V3FO) in order to cause flow through valve V3.  
 
If the real cause were, for example, TL.S2FH – the first potential cause listed in Table 
8, one way to narrow down the possibilities would be to switch the operating mode of 
the system, in this case from ACTIVE to DORMANT. Switching operating modes 
could also highlight hidden potential failures for valve V2. For example, if V2 failed 
open whilst the system was working as in scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode 
then this failure would be masked. Switching to the DORMANT operating mode 
would reveal this failure which would otherwise have remained undetected. For 
scenarios where V2 has already failed in a given operating mode switching modes 
could conceal this failure. For example, if there is flow through valves V1 and V2, no 
flow through V3, and water in the overspill tray in the DORMANT operating mode 
and the system is switched to the ACTIVE mode then the failure at V2 would become 
hidden. 
 
In the DORMANT mode a different set of sensor readings resulting from TL.S2FH 
would occur, which will be one of two possibilities depending on whether or not V2 
was found to be working correctly. The sensors in the ACTIVE operating mode 
indicate that there is flow through all three valves and water in the overspill tray. 
When the operating mode is switched to DORMANT there should be no flow through 
V2. If this is the case then the new set of deviated sensor readings will be no flow 
through V2, flow through V1 and V3 and water in the overspill tray. If there is still 
flow through valve V2 after switching operating modes then this indicates that all four 
sensors have deviated from their normal operating modes. Treating this set of sensor 
values by comparison to the expected set – scenario 16 in Table 1 and applying any of 
the schemes 1 to 4 will produce a set of possible causes. The true cause of the fault 
will be in both lists. Valve V2 failing if not apparent before switching modes will be 
indicated by the addition of this component failure to the potential causes in the list 
from the mode which the system has been switched to. 
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4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Effectiveness of the Schemes 
 
Schemes 1 to 5 were applied to the 16 scenarios listed in Table 1. For each scenario 
results for the ACTIVE and DORMANT operating modes were obtained. The 
introduction of a consistency check in schemes 2 and 4 has resulted in the same or a 
more accurate list of potential causes for each system scenario compared to schemes 1 
and 3 respectively. This is because schemes 1 and 3 do not take into consideration the 
sensor readings that are correct for the given sensor readings. Schemes 1 and 2 have 
both produced potential causes that are invalid to the top event structure, even though 
the fault trees for the sensor readings are correct when analysed individually. For 
certain scenarios scheme 2 has also removed potential causes that are valid to the top 
event structure. This implies that coherent fault trees do not contain enough 
information about the system to produce an accurate list of potential causes. Schemes 
3 and 4 both produce potential causes that are true for the chosen scenario. Scheme 4 
uses non-coherent fault trees and consistency checks, therefore the causes obtained 
are more accurate than those obtained by schemes 1 to 3. Scheme 5 can be used to 
increase the accuracy of the list of potential causes obtained from schemes 1 to 4. 
Therefore scheme 4 used along with scheme 5 is the best model for obtaining 
potential causes of the 16 scenarios for the water tank system. 
 
 
4.2 Scalability and Consistency Checks 
 
The methods presented in this paper for diagnosing faults in systems using FTA to 
explain the deviations from normal values observed in the sensed variables have been 
illustrated using a simple example containing only a small number of components. 
Application to a larger system is required in order to show how effective the methods 
would be when used on real systems.  
 
The computational expense from a large number of sensors is the main problem. 
Introducing consistency checks may be prohibitive for real time analysis of industrial 
systems. Scheme 4 could be heavy on computer processing power, but scheme 3 is 
not as reliable because it does not check consistency. However, this can be solved by 
taking the potential causes obtained from just the deviated sensor readings and 
checking these individually against those from the sensor readings which are true to 
the operating mode. Any potential causes which lead to a contradiction can then be 
removed from the list. 
 
 
4.3 Imperfect Sensors 
 
The method illustrated in this paper has been applied to an example 
which does not account for the possibility of there being imperfect sensors 
in the system. The example used demonstrates the approach taken to fault detection. It 
could accommodate sensor failures by incorporating these events into the fault trees 
for each sensor reading and the analysis performed in the same way. 
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4.4 Obtaining the Exact Cause of Failure 
 
Ideally the most efficient scheme to model the behaviour of a system would be one 
that could determine the exact cause of each scenario. However, in reality there may 
be more than one possible cause. For example, there are 3 potential causes of scenario 
1 in the ACTIVE operating mode (see Table 8). These all indicate that the tank is 
definitely leaking (TL) to create water in the overspill tray, but it is unclear as to 
whether sensor S2 has failed high (S2FH), controller C2 has failed high (C2FH) or 
valve V3 has failed open (V3FO) in order to cause flow through valve V3. 
Valve V3 can fail in 3 different ways that would still produce the same outcome for 
the top event structure. Switching the operating mode in this case does not reduce the 
number of potential causes, but could highlight if there is a problem at valve V2. 
Therefore, a probability for each component would have to be introduced in order to 
deduce which is most likely to have caused the scenario. This addition to the 
calculation procedure would effectively be providing measures [14] for each minimal 
cut set. 
 
 
4.5 Dynamic Effects 
 
At present the water tank system is observed in a steady state. Because of this it is not 
possible, without taking into account transient effects, for some of the 16 scenarios to 
occur. For example a number of the scenarios containing a ‘no flow’ sensor reading 
for valve V1 and flow through at least one of the other two valves produced no 
potential causes, indicating that they could never happen. However, if dynamics were 
taken into consideration then depending on the state of the system these scenarios 
may occur, albeit for a short period of time. Therefore considering the effects of 
dynamics on the water tank would provide a more realistic model of the system 
behaviour. 
 
 
4.6 Two Phased System 
 
The water tank system is assumed to be in one of two phases; these being the flow 
phase through valve V2 when in the ACTIVE operating mode and the no flow phase 
through V2 in the DORMANT operating mode. However, V2 could be partially open 
indicating an intermediate flow phase through the valve. Further analysis could 
therefore consider the behaviour of the system when failure modes are not clear. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
• Fault tree analysis can be used to identify multiple faults in a systems fault 
diagnostic capability. 
 
• Non-coherent fault trees to represent the causes of sensor outputs provide 
more reliable results compared with those obtained using the coherent fault 
trees. 
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• The introduction of consistency checks with the information provided by all 
sensors is required in order to produce an accurate list of all potential causes of 
the current system state. 
  
• Scheme 4, which uses non-coherent fault trees, and checks for consistency by 
using information from all the observation points is the most accurate of 
schemes 1 to 4 for modelling behaviour of the water tank system. 
 
• Scheme 5, which switches the operating mode of the system, can be used 
along side scheme 4 to produce a more precise list of potential causes should 
the system function enable mode switching. 
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